Platos theaetetus a discussion of theories of knowledge

Theodorus assures him that he does, but that he does not want to over-praise the boy, lest anyone suspect he is in love with him.

plato knowledge summary

This follows only if we assume that all judgments are identity statements see note 20or if we assume that knowing what one is thinking of is knowing everything about what one is thinking of cf.

Williams, C.

Plato theaetetus sparknotes

This distinction between arguments against a Protagorean view about perception and a Protagorean view about judgement about perception is relevant to the second objection too da. This, then, represents one version of the empiricist claim: since p. This is the Platonic problem that forms the background for the current discussion. The criticism of D1 breaks down into twelve separate arguments, interrupted by the Digression cc: translated and discussed separately in section 6d. He puts this forward as a working assumption, on behalf of the ordinary folks whom he and Protagoras are addressing a, b , which will help Socrates to show that no one is ever overcome by pleasure: in particular, that reason cannot be outweighed by pleasure. But here again, the definition of knowledge as true judgment with Logos is not immune to criticism. But this does not mean the Forms have been abandoned.

According to option A, Plato retains the idea that a logos is, fundamentally, an enumeration of a thing's elements—though the elements of what is known are not necessarily a thing's parts i. And we will not find this criterion until we find the Forms, the final arbiter of truth.

There is no space here to comment in detail on every one of these arguments, some of which, as noted above, have often been thought frivolous or comically intended cp.

theaetetus quotes

Thus the Theaetetus shows the impossibility of a successful account of knowledge that does not invoke the Forms. On the Unitarian reading, Plato's purpose is to salvage as much as possible of the theories of Protagoras and Heracleitus each respectfully described as ou phaulon: e8, d2.

what is knowledge according to plato

But there can be no beliefs about nothing; and there are false beliefs; so false belief isn't the same thing as believing what is not. According to option B, Plato rejects WP, and also EE, as imposing an unnecessarily restrictive conception of logos on the definition of knowledge as true judgment with an account which then points forward to Theaetetus c—b, especially ab, where he makes this point explicitly.

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Robert Steven Colter, Plato's Theory of Knowledge in the "Theaetetus" and "Republic"