Theodorus assures him that he does, but that he does not want to over-praise the boy, lest anyone suspect he is in love with him.
This follows only if we assume that all judgments are identity statements see note 20or if we assume that knowing what one is thinking of is knowing everything about what one is thinking of cf.
According to option A, Plato retains the idea that a logos is, fundamentally, an enumeration of a thing's elements—though the elements of what is known are not necessarily a thing's parts i. And we will not find this criterion until we find the Forms, the final arbiter of truth.
There is no space here to comment in detail on every one of these arguments, some of which, as noted above, have often been thought frivolous or comically intended cp.
Thus the Theaetetus shows the impossibility of a successful account of knowledge that does not invoke the Forms. On the Unitarian reading, Plato's purpose is to salvage as much as possible of the theories of Protagoras and Heracleitus each respectfully described as ou phaulon: e8, d2.
But there can be no beliefs about nothing; and there are false beliefs; so false belief isn't the same thing as believing what is not. According to option B, Plato rejects WP, and also EE, as imposing an unnecessarily restrictive conception of logos on the definition of knowledge as true judgment with an account which then points forward to Theaetetus c—b, especially ab, where he makes this point explicitly.